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Something Old and Something New: Exploring
the Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence
Ramona L. Lampleyt
New amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective
on December 1, 2017.1 The amendments change Federal Rule of Evidence
803(16), the hearsay exception for ancient documents,2 and add Federal
Rules of Evidence 902(13) and (14), providing for self-authentication by
certified record for information generated by an electronic process or
system and for copied data.3 These changes are largely a reflection of the
digital world in which we live, where documents existing on the internet
may no longer be regarded as trustworthy merely due to their lengthy
existence, and in which authenticating digital information can be costly and
expensive. Additionally, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee for
the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed a revision of Federal Rule of
Evidence 807, which has been published for notice and comment.4 If
approved without modification, the amendments to Rule 807 could take
effect on December 1, 2019.5
f Ramona L. Lampley is a Professor of Law at St. Mary's University School of Law in San Antonio,
Texas. She teaches civil procedure, c-discovery, evidence, sales, secured transactions, and commercial
paper. Professor Lampley has been published in the Washington Law Review, BYU Law Review,
Cornell's Journal of Law and Public Policy, and Essentials of E-discovery. She is also a co-author of
FEDERAL EVIDENCE TACTICS. The author thanks her diligent research assistants Charlie Hayes, Lauren
McCollum, and Katina Zampas for their keen research and comments that contributed to this piece.
1. Letter from the Supreme Court to Congress submitting amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence as adopted by the Supreme Court (April 27, 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frevl 7_dl 86.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU5M-4DS4];
FED. R. EvID. 803(16) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment; FED. R. EVID. 902(13)-(14)
advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
2. FED. R. EvID. 803(16) (2017).
3. FED. R. EvID. 902(13), 902(14) (2017).
4. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, at 1,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USC-RULES-EV-2017-0005 [https://perma.cc/5RLE-TFXP].
The comment period for the proposed amendment o Federal Rule of Evidence 807 closed on February
15, 2018.
5. Id. at 4.
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This article provides a practical, nuts and bolts approach to
understanding the new amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the proposed changes to Rule 807, with a focus on the policy rationale
behind the new rules and pointers for how the new rules can affect
evidentiary foundations. The article first addresses the amendment o Rule
803(16), providing the policy reasons prompting the change and offering
alternative means of assessing hearsay issues for documents that will not
meet the new threshold requirements. In Part II, this article analyzes the
new self-authentication Rules 902 (13)-(14). The section begins with a
discussion of the problems prompting the adoption of the new rules, then
breaks down the requirements to satisfy the elements of the rules. This
section then provides examples of the new rules' application, and concludes
with an analysis of potential Confrontation Clause issues raised by the
amendments. Finally, this article sets forth the proposed amendments to
Rule 807, the residual hearsay exception provision, and discusses the policy
rationale behind the proposed changes.
I. THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT
DOCuMENTS-RULE 803(16)
The text of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16) now provides:
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that
was prepared before January 1, 1998, and whose authenticity is
established.6
The rule provides an exception to the general rule barring hearsay
evidence. It was amended on December 1, 2017 to change the requirement
that the document be "at least 20 years old" to now require that it "was
prepared before January 1, 1998."7 Thus, as time continues to go by, the
fact that a document is twenty years old or more will no longer be sufficient
to meet the foundation for this hearsay exception.
The change was in large part due to the vast amount of electronically
stored information ("ESI") that now accumulates on the internet, company
servers, and other media that does not bear the indicia of reliability that so-
called ancient documents once held.8 The Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules determined that the exception should "be limited due to the
6. FED. R. EviD. 803(16).
7. Id.
8. Report to Standing Committee by Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, at 46 (May 7,
2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-05-07-
evidence_rulesreporttothe standing-committee 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G3C-VYE2] (noting that
"[tihe rationale for the exception has always been questionable, because a document does not magically
become reliable enough to escape the rule against hearsay on the day it turns 20," but concluding the
exception had been tolerated because of its infrequent use, and because usually there is no other evidence
on point).
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risk that it will be used as a vehicle to admit vast amounts of unreliable
electronically stored information."9
Under the amendment, a document is "prepared" when the proffered
statement was recorded in the document.10 Thus, scanning in a hardcopy
of a document does not change the original date of its preparation, provided
the scan does not alter the text of the document. The relevant point for
preparation is the date the information was recorded.'I But if the document
is altered in trial preparation or otherwise after 1998, the exception will not
apply to the alterations.12
The hearsay exception for "ancient documents" in Rule 803(16) is
grounded on several purported, but questionable, assurances of reliability.
First, the document is in writing, is found in an appropriate location for such
documents, and appears unaltered.13 These circumstances tend to support
the conclusion that the statements in the document were true. Second, the
fact that the document was written before January 1, 1998, guarantees, in
many cases, that it was prepared before the current case arose and thus tends
to negate any motive to falsify. Third, for items generated before 1998,
there is an element of necessity. An old writing is thought to be more
reliable than the memory of a witness who executed the document,
assuming that person can even be located. 14
The original proposed amendment, interestingly, would have
eliminated the ancient documents exception entirely, because the Advisory
Committee found the rationale for the hearsay exception questionable: "[A]
document does not magically become reliable enough to escape the rule
against hearsay on the day it turns 20."1s But that proposal sparked
significant negative public comment based on the premise that in certain
types of litigation important documents may no longer be admissible, or
would be admissible only after expending significant time and resources.
Examples of litigation cited by the public commentary in favor of retaining
the ancient documents exception were cases involving latent diseases,
insurance disputes, clergy sexual abuse cases, environmental cleanup cases,
and title disputes.16 In light of the negative public reaction, the Advisory
9. FED. R. EvID. 803(16) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment. See also Report to
Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 151-52 ("Because ESI can be easily and permanently stored, there
is a substantial risk that the terabytes of emails, web pages, and texts generated in the last 20 or so years
could inundate the courts by way of the ancient documents exception.").
10. FED. R. EvID. 803(16) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & RAMONA L. LAMPLEY, FEDERAL EVIDENCE TACTICS § 8.03[21]
(LexisNexis 2018).
14. Id.




Committee elected to narrow, rather than abandon, the ancient documents
exception. 17
The ancient documents exception remains available for documents
prepared before 1998,18 recognizing that some cases involving latent
diseases or environmental damage, for example, may necessitate hardcopy
documents from the past. For documents prepared after 1998, reliable ESI
admissible under some other hearsay exception, such as the exception under
Rule 803(6) for records of regularly conducted activities, likely exists. The
advisory note points out that Rule 807 should be used to admit such
documents upon a showing of reliability, "which will often (though not
always) be found by circumstances as that the document was prepared with
no litigation motive in mind, close in time to the relevant events."19 The
note also states that the new limitation "is not intended to raise an inference
that 20-year-old documents are, as a class, unreliable, or that they should
somehow not qualify for admissibility under Rule 807.",20 But, as discussed
below, Rule 807 is the subject of a proposed amendment that may take
effect later in 2019.21 If no other hearsay exception exists, there may be a
non-hearsay purpose for admitting the document, such as notice.
The amendment continues the requirement that the document's
authenticity be established.22 Thus the authentication requirements under
Rule 901(b)(8) remain unchanged. To authenticate a document under Rule
901 (b)(8), one must satisfy these foundational elements:
(8) Evidence About Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. For a
document or data compilation, evidence that it:
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity;
(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered. 23
Of course, that is not the only method for authenticating a document
that pre-dates 1998. Rule 90 1(a) provides the general rule for authentication
that is satisfied if the proponent "produce[s] evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is;" 24 a threshold
17. Id.
18. FED. R. EvID. 803(16) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
19. Id. See also Report to Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 47 (observing that the Advisory
Committee Note "states the Committee's expectation that the residual exception not only can, but should
be used by courts to admit reliable documents prepared after January 1, 1998 that would have previously
been offered under the ancient documents exception") (emphasis in original).
20. FED. R. EviD. 803(16) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
21. See infra Part II.
22. FED. R. EvID. 803(16).
23. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(8).
24. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
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showing that has been repeatedly observed as not extraordinarily difficult
to satisfy.25
Although the amendment to Rule 803(16)'s ancient documents hearsay
exception will be a significant change for lawyers and academics for whom
the "older than twenty year" rule has become engrained, it likely will not
have a significant impact on the admissibility of critical evidence because
much evidence will be admissible either under a different hearsay exception
or because it is not hearsay at all. Nonetheless, given the proliferation of
unreliable evidence on the internet, and the fact that there is no
clearinghouse operation for unreliable or factually untrue information on
the internet or servers, the amendment reflects a necessity of our modem
reality. No longer can one make the claim that a document's existence for
longer than twenty years bears such high guarantees of its trustworthiness
that its age and authenticity should pave the road to admissibility even if
there is an otherwise valid hearsay.
II. NEWLY ADDED SELF-AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES FOR RECORDS
GENERATED BY AN ELECTRONIC PROCESS OR SYSTEM AND DATA COPIED
FROM AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE-RULES 902(13) AND (14)
Rules 902(13) and 902(14) are new additions to the self-authentication
procedures under the Federal Rules. They became effective December 1,
2017. The new amendments provide:
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A
record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an
accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that
complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The
proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium,
or File. Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file,
if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a
certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification
requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the
notice requirements of Rule 902(11).26
25. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1343 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S.Ct. 1282 (Mar. 19, 2018) (Federal Rule of Evidence 901 "require[s] only enough evidence that a jury
could have reasonably concluded that a document was authentic.") (citing In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs.,
LLC, 781 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015)); United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616,629 (4th Cir. 2015)
("[T]he burden to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high-only a prima facie showing is required, and
a district court's role is to serve as gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a
satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.") (citing
United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. FED. R. EVID. 902(13)14).
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The new rules allow for authentication through a certification of
records generated by an electronic process or system and data copied from
an electronic device. Before the enactment of Rules 902(13) and (14), such
evidence had to be authenticated under Rule 901, which required a
sponsoring witness to testify in court. For example, under Rule 901, a
witness could authenticate evidence about a process or system by
"describing a process or system and showing that it produces an accurate
result."27 Under new Rule 902(13), the proponent may authenticate
information generated by an electronic process or system by presenting a
certification, in lieu of a live witness, that would be sufficient if the witness
were testifying at trial.28
The Advisory Committee notes explaining the new amendment
provide that "the Rule specifically allows the authenticity foundation that
satisfies Rule 901(b)(9) to be established by a certification rather than the
testimony of a live witness."29 Similarly, Rule 902(14) permits a party to
authenticate data copied digitally from an electronic device, storage
medium, or file by written certification of a qualified person, instead of
calling that witness at trial.30
The authentication provided in the certification must be sufficient to
establish authenticity if that testimony were provided by a witness at trial.31
A "qualified person," such as a forensic technical analyst, information
technology expert, or an eDiscovery expert must certify the authenticity of
the data.32 The proponent should ensure that the certification, through the
qualified person, accurately describes the process or system that generated
the records, and why that process is a reliable means of transmission.33 For
Rule 902(14), the qualified person should certify that the electronic copy is
identical to the original by means of comparing hash value or other reliable
means for digital identification.34
The Advisory Committee intended the new rules to save on trial
expenses by reducing the times a live witness must be called at trial to
authenticate electronic evidence. The Advisory Committee observed, "[i]t
27. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9).
28. FED. R. EvID. 902(13).
29. FED. R. EvID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
30. There is some overlap in the new rules. Much evidence proffered under Rule 902(14) could
be offered under Rule 902(13) because the copy is generated by an electronic process. But Rule 902(14)
provides for a specific use of the new certification provisions, the process of authenticating a copy
through use of hash values, which is specific and unique. Thus, application of Rule 902(14) is a narrow
and specific one, whereas 902(13) will reach more broad applications. See Paul W. Grimm, Daniel J.
Capra, Gregory P. Joseph, Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 40-41 (Winter 2017).
31. FED. R. EvID. 902(13)-(14) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
32. FED. R. EvID. 902(13)-(14).
33. Id.; accord FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9).
34. FED. R. EvID. 902(14) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
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is often the case that a party goes to the expense of producing an
authentication witness, and then the adversary either stipulates authenticity
before the witness is called or fails to challenge the authentication testimony
once it is presented."35 This amendment provides a procedure through
which the parties can determine before trial whether a real challenge to
authenticity will be made, saving time and expense if the opposing party
poses no objection to the certification of authenticity.
The new self-authentication rules will be particularly efficient in
authenticating digital evidence duplicated for litigation or trial purposes. As
explained by the notes following the amendment, data copied from
electronic files, devices, or storage media are ordinarily authenticated by
"hash value." "A hash value is a number that is often represented as a
sequence of characters and is produced by an algorithm based upon the
digital contents of a drive, medium, or file." 36 If the hash values for both
the original and copy are identical, it is highly unlikely that the original and
copy themselves are not identical, thus "identical hash values for the
original and copy reliably attest to the fact that they are exact duplicates."37
Rule 902(14) permits certification through a qualified person that she
compared the hash value of the proffered copy to the original and they were
identical. But the rule is not confined to hash values; it permits certification
through "other reliable means of identification provided by future
technology."38
A. Satisfying the Foundation of the Cdrtification Requirement.
First and foremost, one must understand that Rules 902(13) and (14)
do not permit a proffering party to circumvent the authentication
requirement. They simply permit the proponent to do by certification, as a
cost-saving measure, what the proponent would have formerly done by
witness testimony. This means that the evidence must still be authenticated,
whether that is by a written certification that satisfies Rule 901 (b)(9), (b)(4),
(b)(3), or the more general 901(a) standard.39 In addition to substantive
35. FED. R. EvID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
36. FED. R. EVID. 902(14) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) permits authentication through "Distinctive Characteristics and the
Like," such as "[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances." Under Rule 901(b)(3),
authentication is allowed via "[a] comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or
the trier of fact." One can envision authentication of electronic information, particularly digital copies,
under either of these provisions, although other provisions would certainly suffice. The Honorable Paul
W. Grimm, Professor Daniel J. Capra, and Gregory P. Joseph have published a useful and extensive
manual on authenticating digital evidence that addresses authentication requirements for common types
of digital evidence, including emails, text messages, chatroom and other social media conversations,
2018] 525
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authentication requirements, the proponent must also satisfy procedural
requirements under the Rules.
Rules 902(13) and (14) incorporate the procedural requirements for
certification found in Rules 902(11) and (12).40 Rules 902(11) and (12)
permit self-authentication through certification of domestic or foreign
records of regularly conducted activity if the certification sets forth the
elements of Rule 803(6). This procedural reference in newly added Rules
902(13) and (14) is not intended to require, or even permit, a certification
under these rules to prove the requirements of Rule 803(6), which provides
a hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity, commonly
known as the "business records exception."41 Rules 902(13) and (14) are
solely limited to authentication. The proponent must attempt to satisfy any
anticipated hearsay objection(s) separately, through use of a hearsay
exception or by offering it for some non-hearsay purpose.42 In other words,
satisfying the procedural requirements of 902(11) and (12) in terms of
notice and certification will not automatically render a piece of evidence
immune to an otherwise valid hearsay objection.
Instead, the reference to Rules 902(11) and (12) is to incorporate the
procedural and notice requirements of the certification. Rule 902(11)
requires for certification that a "custodian or another qualified person
[provide a certification] that complies with a federal statute or a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court."43 The reference to Rule 902(12) covers
certifications made in foreign countries in a civil case.44 It "must be signed
in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal
penalty in the country where the certification is signed."45 Satisfying these
requirements for certification will, in turn, satisfy the certification
requirements for 902(13) and (14).
The rules do not impose an absolute oath requirement for the
certification to be valid. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 902(11)
advises that a statement complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 will satisfy the
declaration requirement of Rule 902(11), as would any comparable
certification made under oath.46 Section 1746 permits the use of unsworn
declarations to authenticate evidence, if the declarant states that the
websites and internet information, and social media postings. See generally Grimm et al., supra note
30.
40. FED. R. EVID. 902(13-14).
41. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
42. FED. R. EVID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
43. FED. R. EvID. 902(11).
44. FED. R. EVID. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
45. FED. R. EvID. 902(12).
46. FED. R. EvID. 902(11) advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
526 [Vol. 57
Something Old and Something New
information is true and correct and subject to the penalties of perjury.47
Rules 902 (11)-(14) do not prohibit the use of a sworn statement, if that is
preferred.
The offering party must also provide notice as required under Rule
902(11): "[b]efore the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse
party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record-and must
make the record and certification available for inspection-so that the party
has a fair opportunity to challenge them."48 This means the party seeking
to use the authentication-through-certification rule must provide reasonable
written notice to the opponent of its intent to offer the certification, and must
make the record and certification available for inspection, such that the
opponent has an opportunity to consult his own experts and challenge them,
if appropriate. The burden of going forward regarding questions of
authenticity will be on the opponent, while the burden of proof remains with
the proponent.49
A proponent may utilize the self-authentication method under Rule
902(13) and (14) if the following are satisfied:
* [A] qualified person or custodian (likely a forensic technician or
an expert otherwise familiar with information technology) must
make a written declaration under penalty of perjury regarding
the facts which establish the authenticity of the exhibit.s0
* [T]he proponent must provide reasonable written notice of its
intent to use the certification and provide the opponent with the
record and certification for inspection and a fair opportunity to
challenge the authenticity of the record."
* The certification must meet the authentication requirements
necessary should a live witness have been presented to
authenticate the item.52
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Section 1746 permits the following forms for unsworn declarations:
(1) If executed without the United States: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty
of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (date).
(Signature)".
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I
declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)".
Id.
48. FED. R. EvID. 902(11).
49. Grimm et al., supra note 30, at 39-40.
50. IMWRINKELRIED & LAMPLEY, supra note 13, at § 9.02[4][h][i].
51. Id.
52. Id. For a step-by-step tutorial as to the foundational elements for authenticating digital
evidence under Rule 902(13), see EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.03[8]
(10th ed. 2018) (setting forth foundational requirements for expert testimony and chain of custody for
handling of the digital evidence necessary to satisfy authentication requirements for digital evidence).
Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center has produced a short (approximately 7 minutes) video tutorial
2018] 527
Washburn Law Journal
* For Rule 902(13), the certification must, at a minimum, describe
the process or system used by the machine generating the data
and show it produces an accurate result. 5
* For Rule 902(14), the certification must describe the process of
identification, establish it is a reliable means of confirming the
authenticity of the copy, such as describing the system of hash
value comparison, and state the declarant performed the process
of electronic comparison to confirm that the copy is identical to
the original.5 4
Meeting the procedural requirements for certification of authenticity
does not mean the evidence is trial admissible.55 The certification must
establish the proffered record's authenticity.56 The opposing party can still
challenge the electronic process producing the output as unreliable, or the
information as inaccurate. If the offering party fails to give advance notice,
or if the opponent lodges a viable objection to the certification, one can still
call a foundation witness at trial, likely the expert who prepared the
certificate, to establish the authenticity of the records.
The opponent can also still lodge valid objections on other grounds
such as hearsay, relevance, or that the output is not what it purports to be.
For example, one could object that the defendant was not the author, owner,
or poster of the proffered digital evidence. The self-authentication method
simply proves that the record came from a specific electronic system or that
the cloned hard drive is identical to the original.
B. Examples of Typical Uses of New Rules 902(13) and (14).
The new authentication-by-certification procedures provided for in
Rules 902(13) and (14) will have a number of cost-saving applications for
authenticating digital evidence. For example, under Rule 902(13), a
certification could provide the medium in which a qualified person
describes the process in which a webpage printout was retrieved,
authenticating it as a printout of X's social media page, or that a computer
output, such as a database report or spreadsheet, was produced by an
electronic process.57 The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules May 7,
on self-authenticating electronic evidence under the new rules. Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2017-Self-Authenticating Electronic Evidence, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.jc.gov/content/325216/rules-amendments-2017-self-
authenticating-electronic-evidence [https://perma.cc/NTV5-S998].
53. IMWINKELRIED & LAMPLEY, supra note 13, at § 9.02[h][i]. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
54. FED. R. EvID. 902(13)-(14) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. FED. R. EviD. 902(13) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
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2016 Report to the Standing Committee detailed the following examples of
useful applications of new Rules 902(13) and (14).
1. Rule 902(13)
1. Proving that a USB device was connected to (i.e., plugged into) a
computer:
In a hypothetical civil or criminal case in Chicago, a disputed issue is
whether Devera Hall used her computer to access files stored on a USB
thumb drive owned by a co-worker. Ms. Hall's computer uses the
Windows operating system, which automatically records information
about every USB device connected to her computer in a database known
as the "Windows registry." The Windows registry database is maintained
on the computer by the Windows operating system in order to facilitate
the computer's operations. A forensic technician, located in Dallas,
Texas, has provided a printout from the Windows registry that indicates
that a USB thumb drive, identified by manufacturer, model, and serial
number, was last connected to Ms. Hall's computer at a specific date and
time.58
Without the benefit of Rule 902(13), the proponent would have to call
a live witness, a forensic technician, who would testify as to his background
and qualifications, the process by which digital forensic examinations are
conducted, the steps taken during his examination of the Hall computer, a
description of the Windows registry system and how it maintains USB
information, and the steps he took to verify that the Windows registry
information matched the information on the USB.
With 902(13), the proponent could provide this testimony through a
certification. The certification would still provide the forensic expert's
background and qualifications. It would still describe the process of digital
forensic examinations, including a description of how the Windows registry
maintains identifying information for every USB inserted into the computer.
The technician would verify that the Windows registry produces an accurate
result and that the printout of the registry information matches the USB by
manufacturer, model, and serial number. If the proponent satisfies the
notice requirement and the opponent does not dispute the accuracy or
reliability of the process used to produce the registry printout, the proponent
would not need to call the forensic technician for authentication.
Other examples of such machine-generated information include
internet browser histories and Wi-Fi access logs.59 Consider this example
given by the Advisory Committee:




2. Proving that a server was used to connect to a particular webpage:
Hypothetically, a malicious hacker executed a denial-of-service attack
against Acme's website. Acme's server maintained an Internet
Information Services (IIS) log that automatically records information
about every internet connection routed to the web server to view a web
page, including the IP address, webpage, user agent string and what was
requested from the website. The IIS logs reflected repeated access to
Acme's website from an IP address known to be used by the hacker. The
proponent wants to introduce the IIS log to prove that the hacker's IP
address was an instrument of the attack.60
With Rule 902(13), the proponent can have an appropriately trained
website expert certify a description of the mechanics of the server's
operating system, his search of the IIS log, how the log works and retains
information, and that the exhibit to be introduced is an accurate reflection
of the IIS log. If the opponent does not object to the accuracy of the log,
the proponent would not need to call the witness at trial. 61
Another example of a potential use of the Rule 902(13) certification is
to prove GPS location through digital information:
3. Proving that a person was or was not near the scene of an event:
Hypothetically, Robert Jackson is a defendant in a civil (or criminal)
action alleging that he was the driver in a hit-and-run collision with a U.S.
Postal Service mail carrier in Atlanta at 2:15 p.m. on March 6, 2015. Mr.
Jackson owns an iPhone, which has software that records machine-
generated dates, times, and GPS coordinates of each picture he takes with
his iPhone. Mr. Jackson's iPhone contains two pictures of his home in an
Atlanta suburb at about 1 p.m. on March 6. He wants to introduce into
evidence the photos together with the metadata, including the date, time,
and GPS coordinates, recovered forensically from his iPhone to
corroborate his alibi that he was at home several miles from the scene at
the time of the collision.62
By using Rule 902(13), the proponent could rely on a forensic
technician, who would certify facts regarding the iPhone operating system,
including that it records machine-generated dates, times, and GPS
coordinates of the photographs. The technician would also certify his
process of searching the iPhone, the results of the metadata found, and that
the exhibit is an accurate reflection of the photographs.6 3
Rule 902(13) can also be used to prove information gathered in a text
message log:
4. Proving association and activity between alleged co-conspirators:
60. Id.
61. Id. at 51.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 52.
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Hypothetically, Ian Nichols is charged with conspiracy to commit the
robbery of First National Bank that occurred in San Diego on January 30,
2015. Two robbers drove away in a silver Ford Taurus. The alleged co-
conspirator was Dain Miller. Dain was arrested on an outstanding warrant
on February 1, 2015, and in his pocket was his Samsung Galaxy phone.
The Samsung phone's software automatically maintains a log of text
messages that includes the text content, date, time, and number of the
other phone involved. Pursuant to a warrant, forensic technicians
examined Dain's phone and located four text messages to Ian's phone
from January 29: "Meet my house @9"; "Is Taurus the Bull out of
shop?"; "Sheri says you have some blow"; and "see ya tomorrow." In the
separate trial of Ian, the government wants to offer the four text messages
to prove the conspiracy.
By using Rule 902(13), the proponent would provide notice of and a
copy of the forensic technician's certification regarding Dain's phone
operating system, his search of the phone's text message logs, how logs are
created, and that the exhibit is an accurate reflection of Dain's phone's log.
If the opposing party does not dispute the reliability or accuracy of the
process that produced the log, or the text message log itself, the proponent
would not need to call the expert at trial.65
Note that in the preceding example, the opponent may still have a
hearsay objection to the text messages found on Dain's phone. The court
would need to evaluate the statement, "Sheri says you have some blow," to
determine whether it is an admissible co-conspirator statement during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and under Rule
805 to assess hearsay within hearsay.66
2. Rule 902(14)
Under Rule 902(14), a forensic technician could make a copy of a
phone, using hash values or other reliable means, and the proponent could
authenticate the copy through a certification that describes the process used
and verifies the copy.67 This would allow the proponent to forego calling
the witness at trial, absent an objection from the opponent regarding the
reliability of the process. Note, authentication in this manner requires
meticulous observation and preservation of the digital evidence in
collection and duplication that preserves hash values, which are presently
the most accepted way of establishing identical duplication.68
64. Report to Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 52.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. FED. R. EvID. 902(14) advisory committee's note to 2017 amendment.
68. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 4.03 [9] (10th ed. 2018).
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However, the rules do not eliminate the need for the proponent to
. establish authorship, relevance, or avoid any other objections an opponent
may have.69 The new rules simply provide a procedure for affirmation that
an output came from a certain electronic process or that an electronic copy
is the equivalent of the original. Challenges to authenticity of electronic
evidence may require technical information about the system or process at
issue. Thus, the proponent should be prepared to answer additional
challenges an opponent may have. Additionally, if the authenticity of the
digital evidence will be interjected at trial or pose a question in a juror's
mind, the offering party may elect, for strategic reasons, to call the
foundation witness at trial.
C. Criminal Trial-The Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to
Confrontation.
In a criminal trial, self-authentication through certification of
electronic output or data may present a somewhat nuanced confrontation
issue, which may lead a criminal defendant to object to the certification of
authentication itself as violating the defendant's right to confrontation in a
criminal trial. In Crawford v. Washington,70 the Supreme Court held that if
the prosecution is offering into evidence "testimonial" hearsay, it must
show that the declarant is unavailable to testify and that at the time the
statement was made, the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.71 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,72 the Supreme Court held
that sworn "certificates of analysis," stating the results of lab tests on
suspected drugs, were testimonial hearsay, and hence, required that the
defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.73 The
Supreme Court noted that although the documents at issue were called
certificates, they were definitively affidavits, prepared specifically for the
purpose of identifying the drugs for the criminal trial. 74 Justice Thomas
provided the fifth vote, noting that the statements were "sworn." 75 For him
that was apparently critical, but it leaves open the question on how he might
vote if the lab reports were not submitted under oath.
Because the certificate of authenticity under Rules 902(13) and (14) is
prepared for trial, it seems to fall within the Melendez-Diaz scope of
69. Id.
70. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
71. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 59.
72. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
73. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 329.
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"testimonial," presenting a potential Confrontation Clause issue.76 The
. purpose behind Rules 902(13) and (14) is to avoid the expense of calling a
live witness at trial. With no declarant to cross-examine at trial, and no
opportunity to do so prior to trial, a potential Confrontation Clause issue
exists, but only if the certification is testimonial. In Melendez-Diaz, the
Court "carved out" certain authentication certificates from the core class of
testimonial hearsay:
The dissent identifies a single class of evidence which, though prepared
for use at trial, was traditionally admissible: a clerk's certificate
authenticating an official record-or a copy thereof-for use as evidence.
But a clerk's authority in that regard was narrowly circumscribed. He
was permitted "to certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept in
his office," but had "no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of a
lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to
certify to its substance or effect.".... The dissent suggests that the fact
that this exception was "narrowly circumscribed" makes no difference.
To the contrary, it makes all the difference in the world. It shows that
even the line of cases establishing the one narrow exception the dissent
has been able to identify simultaneously vindicates the general rule
applicable to the present case. A clerk could by affidavit authenticate or
provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but could not do what
the analysts did here: create a record for the sole purpose of providing
evidence against a defendant.77
The Melendez-Diaz carve-out recognizes a narrow exception from the
constitutionally protected category of "testimonial" evidence when the
certification is that the proffered exhibit is a copy of an "otherwise
admissible record." But the exception will not apply when the record that
is being certified was created for the purpose of providing evidence at
trial.78
A number of circuit courts have addressed this issue in the context of
Rule 902(11) (authentication of domestics records of regularly conducted
activity). Each court has held that the certification of Rule 803(6) elements
was not testimonial, and hence, its admission did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because the certificate authenticated business records
that were already existing, not ones created specifically for trial.79 Because
76. Id. at 311.
77. Id. at 322-23 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. See also IMWINKELRIED & LAMPLEY, supra note 13, at § 9.02[h][iii]; Grimm et al., supra
note 30, at 46-51.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 822 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding records "were
routine and prepared in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of prosecution;" thus they
were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Albino-Loe, 747
F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cit. 2014) ("[A] routine certification by the custodian of a domestic public
record . .. and a routine attestation to authority and signature ... are not testimonial in nature."); United
States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1323 (10th Cir. 2014) (authentication certification of debit card records
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Rule 902(14) deals specifically with duplication of electronic information,
a certification that copied information has been verified as identical through
hash values or other reliable processes should not be testimonial under the
reasoning of the cases applying the Melendez-Diaz clerical exception to
Rule 902(11) certifications.
The same analysis may pertain to a certification under Rule 902(13)
for records purely derived from a webpage or other electronic source. The
laboratory certification at issue in Melendez-Diaz purportedly interpreted
test results that were conducted with human input in anticipation of
litigation, making them testimonial.80 Thus, there is some room to
distinguish Melendez-Diaz and argue that certifications under Rule 902(13)
are not testimonial. But Rule 902(13) also includes information that is
electronically generated. A certification that such information is produced
by a reliable process, or is accurate, would arguably be closer to the type of
certification held testimonial in Melendez-Diaz. Take, for example, a
certification that a computer reliably produced an analysis of a statistical
probability of DNA. The machine-generated analysis could have been
created for trial purposes. This is the scenario the Melendez-Diaz court held
would be within the testimonial class.
That does not mean that a Confrontation Clause violation occurs with
certification of machine-generated information, however, because such
information is not hearsay.81 With machine-generated ata, there is no
statement and no declarant to cross-examine. Instead, the likely challenge
would be to the reliability of the process or method of computation
held not testimonial); United States v. Thompson, 686 F.3d 575, 581 (8th Cir. 2012) (certificate of
authenticity of copies of employment records held not testimonial); United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d
494, 505 (8th Cir. 2012) (certificate of authenticity under Rule 902(11) certifying lab report exhibit as
true copy held not testimonial); United States v. Mallory, 461 F. App'x 352, 357 (4th Cir. 2012)
("Consequently, Melendez-Diaz makes clear that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses does
not include the right to confront a records custodian who submits a Rule 902(11) certification of a record
that was created in the course of a regularly conducted business activity."); United States v. Yeley-
Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 680-81 (10th Cir. 2011) (Rule 902(11) certificate that cell phone records meet
business records exception held not testimonial because the purpose was to authenticate business records
already existing, not to establish evidence at trial); United States v. Green, 396 F. App'x 573, 575 (11th
Cir. 2010) (concluding cell phone records that were created in the ordinary course of business and "not
for the purpose of proving a fact at a criminal trial" were non-testimonial and did not violate the
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Schwartz, 315 F. App'x 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Business
records admitted pursuant to a hearsay exception, however, are not 'testimonial' and therefore do not
implicate the Confrontation Clause."); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006)
(foundational evidence to authenticate medical records under Rule 902(11) held not testimonial because
the statements conveyed no information about the defendant, but merely the process and procedure
necessary to create a business record).
80. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308-11.
81. See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[D]ata are not 'statements' in
any useful sense. Nor is a machine a 'witness against' anyone."). For a robust discussion of the
Confrontation Clause objections to proposed Rules 902(13)-(14) and a response, see Grimm et al., supra
note 30, at 46-51.
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producing the results. If the reliability or accuracy of the process,
computation, or system is in question, the opponent should object to its
admissibility and argue that the declarant should be subject to cross-
examination because the item has not been authenticated.82
Many Rule 902(13) certifications will fall within the "narrow
exception" held not testimonial by Melendez-Diaz, in that they certify solely
that the evidence existed before the litigation arose and the evidence was
not created for purpose of providing testimony against an accused. But
there is no one size fits all approach for Rule 902(13) certifications, which
are not limited to duplicate digital evidence. Future cases will develop
whether a Crawford objection may be successfully maintained against a
Rule 902(13) certification that the data was generated through a reliable and
accurate electronic process. 83
The Advisory Committee for the Rules of Evidence opined that Rules
902(13) and (14) would present no Confrontation Clause issue, stating:
The Committee is satisfied that no constitutional issue is presented,
because the Supreme Court has stated in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 322 (2009), that even when a certificate is
prepared for litigation, the admission of that certificate is consistent with
the right to confrontation if it does nothing more than authenticate another
document or item of evidence. That is all that these certificates would be
doing under the Rule 902(13) and (14) proposals. The Committee also
relied on the fact that the lower courts have uniformly held that
certificates prepared under Rule 902(11) do not violate the right to
confrontation; those courts have relied on the Supreme Court's statement
in Melendez-Diaz ... . There is of course no intention or implication
from the amendment that a certification could somehow be a means of
bringing otherwise testimonial reports into court. But the Committee
concluded that if the underlying report is not testimonial, the certification
of authenticity will not raise a constitutional issue under the current state
of the law. 84
Whether that view remains true for the majority of issues in which the
new rules are applied will be an issue to be developed by the parties and
courts. In sum, Rules 902(13) and (14) present an opportunity to streamline
authentication issues in advance of trial and to save time and expense by
82. But see Grimm et al., supra note 30, at 51 (opining that the Confrontation Clause objection to
certifying accuracy is overstated because, in part, it is no different from objections to Rule 902(11)
certifications as to reliability).
83. But see id. at 49-50 (arguing that even when generated in anticipation, machine generated
evidence authenticated under Rule 902(13) is generally not testimonial because it is not hearsay, since
machines do not make statements and cannot be cross-examined).
84. Report to Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 53-54 (noting that "the Committee emphasizes
that the goal of the amendment is a narrow one: to allow authentication of electronic information that




avoiding the need to call a witness to authenticate evidence when the
authenticity is not in dispute. For cases in which the accuracy, reliability,
or authenticity is in dispute, the proponent can still call the foundational
witness. In civil cases and in many applications of the certification
procedure in criminal cases, there will be no Confrontation Clause issue for
the reasons discussed above. However, the language of Rule 902(13) is
sufficiently broad, such that if a record is created for the purpose of using it
in a criminal trial against a defendant, there may be a meritorious argument
that the defendant must have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
who would testify as to the process and accuracy of the result. The contours
of this limited situation will have to be developed by later cases.
HI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 807
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Practice and
Procedure ("the committee") approved publication of proposed
amendments to the Federal Rule of Evidence 807 for a public comment
period that ended February 15, 2018. Rule 807, commonly called the
residual hearsay exception, allows, in some scenarios, the admission of
hearsay statements that are not covered under Rule 803 (Exceptions to the
Rule Against Hearsay) and Rule 804 (Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant
Unavailable). Currently, Rule 807 is only applied in rare cases, but the
proposed language of the amendments may allow for a wider application of
the exception in some instances, and a more limited use in others. Scholars
and members of the committee argue that the proposed amendments will
increase flexibility of the exception, prevent distortion of other exceptions,
reduce the interdependence between the exceptions, and broaden the
exception to allow more reliable hearsay to be admitted.
8 5
A. Rule 807 and Proposed Changes.
The proposed changes are as follows:
Rule 807. Residual Exception
(a) In General. Under the following eireumstanees conditions, a hearsay
statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. even-if
(1) the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in
Rule 803 or 804-i
(4- 2) the statement has eqivalent eircumastantial guarantees ot
tustwothin.ess the court determines that it is supported by sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness-after considering the totality of
85. See Daniel J. Capra, Expanding (Or Just Fixing) The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
85 FORDHAM L. REv. 1577, 1581-94 (2017) (discussing the purpose of amending the current rule).
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circumstances under which it was made and any evidence corroborating
the statement and
(2) it is Offee_d As -1 -; RidAneA-f A m-AtrfiAI fact4;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable effortstad
(4) admitting it will best ser.'e the purposes of these rules and the interests
efjstee.
(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, befcre the trial or hearing,
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of thean intent to
offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and
addres&,-including its substance and the declarant's name-so that the
party has a fair opportunity to meet it. The notice must be provided in
writing before the trial or hearing-or in any form during the trial or
hearing if the court, for aood cause, excuses a lack of earlier notice.86
B. Deletion of "Equivalency of Trustworthiness. "
The Advisory Committee's proposed removal of the equivalence of
trustworthiness standard is intended to provide an easier application of the
trustworthiness requirement and to ameliorate varying discretionary
assessments of the "equivalence" standard.8 7 The current version of the
Rule requires courts to compare the trustworthiness guarantees of proffered
hearsay to those in Rules 803 and 804.88 This requirement often results in
varied decisions among the courts because the trustworthiness guarantees
found in Rules 803 and 804 differ in scope.89 As the Advisory Committee
noted, "The requirement that the court find trustworthiness 'equivalent' to
the circumstantial guarantees in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions is
exceedingly difficult to apply, because there is no unitary standard of
trustworthiness in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions."90 The Committee
continued, "Given the difficulty and disutility of the 'equivalence' standard,
the Committee has determined that a better, more user-friendly approach is
86. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 807, 82 Fed. Reg. 37610, at 69-70
(proposed Aug. 11, 2017) (to be codified at Fed. R. Evid. 807),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-EV-2017-0005-0001 [https://perma.cc/668J-
BSG5] (new material is underlined, matter to be omitted is lined through) [hereinafter Proposed Rule
807].
87. Id. at 68 (quoting excerpt from Memorandum Regarding Report of the Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules from William K. Sessions, III, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Jeffrey
S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 16 (May 7, 2016)).
88. See FED. R. EvID. 807.
89. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 68. See also Capra, supra note 85, at 1581-82 (noting,
for example, that "it is common ground that the reliability guarantees of Rule 804's exceptions are
weaker than those for Rule 803's exceptions-yet the equivalence language requires the court o
compare the proffered hearsay to both the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.").
90. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 68.
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simply to require the judge to find that the hearsay offered under Rule 807
is trustworthy."91
Proponents of this change to remove the "equivalent" guarantees of
trustworthiness standard in favor of a straightforward trustworthiness
standard posit that removal of the standard will prevent erroneous
comparisons to the measures set forth in Rules 803 and 804 and remove the
interdependence between the hearsay exceptions that would then allow the
Rules to be evaluated individually.92 Note that the proposed Rule takes a
somewhat opposite view; the proposed Rule would require the proponent
"to establish that the proffered hearsay is a statement hat 'is not specifically
covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804."'93 Thus, the proposed
rule limits the circumstances in which Rule 807 can be invoked to those not
already covered, and excludes evidence that fails an already existing
exception. It "remains an exception to be invoked only when necessary."94
Opponents of the amendment to the equivalency of trustworthiness
standard cite a lack of case law and the rare reversal of cases when arguing
against changing the standard.95 They also point to the intended application
of the exception as a limited one and view the exclusion of evidence under
this Rule as a result in line with the original intent of Congress.96
Additionally, opponents raise concerns over possible uncertainty that could
result from amendment. Those opposed to amendment on this issue state
that the proposal to broaden the trustworthiness consideration could
interrupt the predictability of evidentiary considerations during trial.97
C. Defining "Trustworthiness" through Consideration of Corroborating
91. Id.
92. See id. (discussing the wide discretionary standard that has developed contrary to the intent of
the drafters); see also The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Comments on the
Proposed Changes to Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.nacdl.orgfWorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspxid=50318&liblD=50290
[https://perma.cc/G2FD-SQEM].
93. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, proposed advisory committee note at 71.
94. Id.
95. See Victor Gold, The Three Commandments ofAmending the Federal Rules of Evidence, 85
FORDHAM L. REv. 1615, 1619-20 (2017) (stating that a majority of courts engage in consideration of
reliability in light of traditional exceptions).
96. See id. (arguing that amendment would undermine the intent of the rule). Note that the
proposed amendments to Rule 807 have changed somewhat since the publication of Professor Gold's
article. The proposal now requires, as an element of Rule 807, that the statement not be covered by a
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804, which will limit the expansion of the rule. Compare id. at 1617-
18 with Proposed Rule 807(a)(1).
97. See Gold, supra note 95, at 1621 (comparing consequences of the proposed amendments to the
2000 amendment of Rule 702).
538 [Vol. 57
Something Old and Something New
Evidence.
The Advisory Committee's proposed amendment would allow courts
to consider corroborating evidence in determining the validity of statements
under the residual hearsay exception.98 The proposed Advisory Committee
note reflects, "Most courts have required the consideration of corroborating
evidence, though some courts have disagreed."99 The amendment would
provide a uniform approach, recognizing that the existence or absence of
corroboration is relevant to the accuracy of the statement.100 Proponents of
this change opine that this amendment would strengthen the determination
of validity in hearsay statements.101
Commentators, such as the Federal Magistrate Judges Association
("FMJA"), expressed concern regarding the language used in this proposed
amendment.102 The FMJA argued that the language could be clearer and
expressed concern that the current language might result in more persuasive
evidence being admitted because it is corroborated with weaker evidence,
therefore expanding the scope of the exception.103 However, proponents of
the rule contend, "The ultimate inquiry is whether the declarant is telling
the truth, and reference to corroborating evidence is a typical and time-
tested means of helping to establish that a person is telling the truth" and
consideration of corroborating evidence is used in trials every day. 104
D. Removal ofMateriality/Interest ofJustice Requirements.
The Advisory Committee voted to delete the requirement that the
evidence proffered under Rule 807 be evidence of a material fact and that
its admission would serve the purposes of the Federal Rules and interests of
justice. According to the proposed Committee note, "These requirements
have proved to be superfluous in that they are already found in other rules
(see Rules 102, 401)."105 Specifically, the Advisory Committee observed
that the language "material fact" is in conflict with the avoidance of the term
98. See Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 71, Proposed Advisory Committee Note to Rule 807
("The amendment specifically allows the court to consider corroborating evidence in the trustworthiness
enquiry.").
99. Id.
100. Id. See also Capra, supra note 85, at 1585 ("Finally, courts should be allowed to consider that
no corroborating evidence has been presented. If there is no corroborating evidence, then, just as in real
life, a factfinder needs to be more wary about accepting the conclusion.")
101. See Capra, supra note 85, at 1584.
102. Federal Magistrate Judges Association, Comments on the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure Set Forth in the Preliminary Draft ofAugust 2017 (Jan.
25, 2018).
103. Id.
104. Capra, supra note 85, at 1584.
105. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 71, Proposed Advisory Committee note to Rule 807.
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"materiality" in Rule 403.106 Additionally, because courts have analogized
material for Rule 807 purposes to relevance under Rule 403, it is
superfluous. Similarly, nothing is added by including an element to serve
"the interests of justice and the purpose of the rules" because that guidance
is already provided by Rule 102.107
Scholars, such as Victor Gold, express concern over the potential
effects that this change might have in terms of a trial and rulings on the
evidence considered under this Rule.10 8 Gold points to the amendment of
Rule 702 that was adopted in 2000 in comparing the potential effect that a
broader standard might have on the courts.109 Gold argues that amendment
to this standard will result in a vague standard that might then lead to
uncertain consequences in evidentiary rulings.110
E. Retention of "More Probative" Requirement.
The Advisory Committee on the Evidence Rules left intact the
language requiring that a hearsay statement must be "more probative than
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
efforts."1  Through preservation of this language, the Committee
expressed a desire to leave the residual hearsay exception a limited one.112
Proponents of change in this area of the Rule expressed concern that
the more probative requirement has been interpreted by courts in a manner
that precludes the party from presenting the best evidence it finds
persuasive, or worse, the cumulative persuasive value of the proffered
evidence in addition to other evidence.113 As Professor Daniel J. Capra has
argued,
It is odd to allow a court under an evidence rule to tell the litigant, "there
is other evidence that is as strong or stronger than what you have
106. Id. at 68. Rule 403 provides, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 403.
107. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 68. Rule 102 provides, "[t]hese rules should be construed
so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and elay, and promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination."
FED. R. EvID. 102.
108. See Gold, supra note 95, at 1621 (arguing that this change would result in a constrained
standard which may delay courts in ruling on evidentiary matters).
109. Id. at 1621-22.
110. See id.
111. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 69.
112. See id. ("Retaining the 'more probative' requirement indicates that there is no intent to expand
the residual exception, only to improve it. The 'more probative' requirement ensures that the rule will
only be invoked when it is necessary to do so.").
113. See Capra, supra note 85, at 1586-87 ("The 'more probative' language allows the court to
wrest control from the party, who should have the autonomy to decide which of two pieces of reliable
evidence it should present-or whether to present both.").
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presented to me, so go and get that." Shouldn't the litigant have the
autonomy to figure out what evidence it wants to put in, so long as it is
probative and reliable?I14
F. Notice Requirement.
The Advisory Committee also proposed amendments to the notice
requirement for Rule 807. The amendments to the notice provision allow a
court to excuse lack of notice for good cause. Other changes include: (1)
the word "particulars" has been removed; (2) notice in writing is now
required; and (3) the requirement that a declarant's address be listed has
been removed.11 5 In amending the notice requirements, the Advisory
Committee expressed a desire to delete superfluous language, and prevent
disputes on whether notice has actually been given.116 Furthermore,
amending Rule 807 to add a good cause requirement would resolve a
conflict between courts, as many courts have interpreted the Rule as
containing a good cause requirement already, while others have
disagreed.117 Additionally, proponents in favor of removing "particulars"
and replacing it with "substance" have noted that substance is found in Rule
103(a)(2), which will allow courts and attorneys to determine the scope of
notice required.I1 I
The Advisory Committee did not elect to add an additional layer to the
notice requirement of intent to offer the statement under the residual hearsay
exception (the notice requirement pertains to the intent to offer the
statement, not the applicable exception).11
9 The rationale is that the
proponent may not know at the time he provides notice that he or she will
need to resort to the residual hearsay exception, resulting in a wide net
approach where the proponent provides notice of intent to use the residual
hearsay exception for all hearsay evidence, in case it becomes necessary to
invoke the rule.120 Thus, the notice requirement pertains to intent to offer
114. See id. at 1586 (discussing the position of the Montana Rules Commission, which
recommended that Montana adopt a version of Rule 807 without the "more probative requirement"
because the restriction "would have the effect of severely limiting the instances in which the exception
would be used and would be impractical in the sense that a party would generally offer the strongest
evidence available regardless of the existence of the requirement.") (quoting Montana Rule of Evidence
803(24) Montana rules commission comment).
115. See Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 69.
116. See id. at 72.
117. Capra, supra note 85, at 1595. Professor Capra offers the following examples of when an
exception to the pretrial notice requirements seems justified and necessary: "(1) statements from
declarants that, despite diligent efforts, are only discovered once trial has begun and (2) hearsay
statements of people who are scheduled to be called as witnesses but who, without warning, become
unavailable at the time of trial." Id.
118. Id. at 1598.




the particular statement, and does not necessarily require the proponent to
articulate the grounds for doing so. However, some courts have imposed a
requirement under current Rule 807 of notice of intent to proffer the
statement and use the residual hearsay exception.'2 '
Commentators seem to look favorably upon the amended notice
requirements. However, specific associations, such as The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, commented seeking to add a
caveat to the notice requirement that would make clear the different notice
standards in criminal law in consideration of constitutional guarantees and
protections given to the accused.122
Comments for the proposed amendments to Rule 807 closed on
February 15, 2018. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of
Evidence will review the public comments, make any changes necessitated
by public comment, and either republish a revised rule for public comment
or submit the final rule to the Standing Committee for approval.123
IV. CONCLUSION
The reality of our increasingly digital life necessitated significant
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence effective December 1, 2017. The
"ancient documents" hearsay exception no longer applies to documents that
are more than twenty years old; instead the document must have been in
existence prior to 1998, reflecting the reality that much evidence retained or
published on the internet does not meet a threshold showing of reliability
simply because of its continued existence. Additionally, new Rules 902(13)
and (14) permitting self-authentication through a certification satisfying the
authentication requirements for electronically-generated evidence or digital
copies of electronic evidence should save the time and expense of
authenticating such evidence through live witness testimony in many cases.
Finally, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence has
proposed significant changes to the residual exception for hearsay, Rule
807, designed to promote uniformity in its application, reduce the
ambiguous standards some courts used in determining equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness, remove superfluous standards such as
material fact and serving the interest of justice, and improve the notice
requirements.
121. See id. at 1599 n.110 (collecting cases). See also United States. v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358
(2d Cir. 1978) ("Rule 803(24) [now Rule 807] clearly requires ... that provision can be utilized only if
notice of an intention to rely upon it is given in advance of trial.") (emphasis in original).
122. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 92.
123. Proposed Rule 807, supra note 86, at 81-82 (describing procedures for advisory committee
and Standing Committee after the period for public comment closes).
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